



the French Articulation of the Temporality of
Becoming and the Worldliness of
Consciousness . . . as Undermining Nostalgia, the
Tension between Painting and Photography, the
ground of Heroic existentialism and Happy Meta-
physics·
Gail Weiss and Galen Johnson have given us ways to think
about the tine in Freneh thought that develops the import of
Husserl's notion of indeterminacy that culminates in the work of
Merleau-Ponty, described by Weiss and Johnson as • wild-
flowering," "pagan" and "without father"--terms 1'11 return to at the
eonclusion of my eomments. Weiss and Johnson, instead of
retreating to the obscure reaches of metaphysics or epistemology,
or to poetie or abstract pronouncements, give us specific issues in
ethics and aestheties with whieh to measure the power of their
interpretations. I heartily agree with both their positions and seek
only to further the tine they've drawn and to draw their positions
together by delineating how both their discussions at bottom center
of Merleau-Ponty's notion of temporality as radical becoming and
the eorrelative decentering of what formerly had been isolated as
"conseiousness· towards a sense of understanding the world in and
through the body--and the body taken to be an "open straits" upon
the flow of the world, or to use a different metaphor, as part of the
fabrie of the world.
Weiss begins by diseussing Husserl's notions of
indeterminacy, and rightly suggests that the always incomplete
nature of various modes of apprehension, as outstanding
possibilities to be realized, does not do justiee to a deeper sense of
indeterminaey, which cannot be resolved by no matter how many
aets of apprehension, and then goes on to explore the Husserlian
nation of "fringe presentations" which are the eontext of any
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thematic presentation. However, by the end of her paper, Weiss
again rightly suggests that this indeterminacy is not on just on the
fringe, is not a merely horizonal phenomenon, but is at the depth of
experience, at its heart. She believes that these French
philosophers have opened up another side of givenness, a dimension
of latency, which is different in the analysis of Oe Beauvoir, Camus
and Merleau-Ponty. Weiss warns us that the notions of ambiguity,
absurdity and reversibility Wcannot be reduced to one another as
different names for the phenomenon of indeterminacy" (p. 20).
However, I would like to suggest that all three notions can be seen
to be aspects of taking perception, embodiment and enmeshment
within the world as a temporal ongoing becoming. It is this
temporality of an expanded notion of the body that always
announces itself in choice, in action, in apprehension and--as
Johnson discusses--in expression as indeterminate. Since indetermi-
nacy is at the heart of time and of our being in the world, each of
these thinkers calls for a taking up of that indeterminacy, a creative
working with it, in and through it, in choice, in action, in articulation
and in arte
Oe Beauvoir's Wethics of ambiguity" advocates an embrace
of the tension between the determinacy of a "choice" and it's
"goal" and between equally ethically Wjustifiable alternatives,"
because it seeks to live in a place between these categories. These
categories are tokens of a rationalist perspective of human being,
rather than one that does justice to a materially situated, that is,
embodied being, always in the process of becoming what it is. To
return to the dilemma of the young man choosing between his duty
to his mother and his duty to his country on behalf of humanity, the
point is that the fact that both courses of action can be "ethically
defendedw shows that there is no such "choice"--not between
principles to be imposed upon his situation. To choose existentially
is to leave the plane of reflection which deals with constant
mentalistic identities and generalities in order to enter the specific,
unique wworking throughWof the complex interrelations of material
beings who feel, perceive, find nuance, connect with the changing
imaginary and are constantly transformed in their identity by what
they encounter in their embodied being. The young man does not
choose between two preexisting possibilities: he makes one
possible by psinstskingly becoming what he chooses by working on
what the choice is about in the world. He makes a different love
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come into being between he and his mother, he becomes a different
kind of son, or his mother beeomes a different mother who has seen
her son's mission in a larger world and altered her neediness, but
the past will become something other than it was as it presented
itself as a basis for decision. One doesn't choose a possible future,
one enters a present in a new way that may bring about a
transformation of present and past, which gives a future that could
have followed from such a paste A pure consciousness is not
caught in a past and could ·choose a future.· A human being
commits to a future, to becoming something else, to having made
the choice on a basis that will be gradually transformed into a
rightness and only on this basis becomes a future. The commitment
is to transform the world as a making right for who one becomes
gradually, and is only possible for an embodied being with this
·thickness· to it's being: a being that can be shaped, molded,
worked with, through the power of interrelation of eommitment and
passion. This being exists in a time that has weight and thickness
because it exists equally ·out there· in things, which also gives it
redemptive powers of transformation.
For Camus, he realized that each moment, lived in its
sensual fullness has a perfeetion to it, a sense whieh speaks to eaeh
person. Yet, it is the demand that over time, over a lifetime, that
there bs a perfect order, an answer, a foundation for meaning, that
the demand midwifes the absurd. It is the eonfrontation of human
with world, of human with other humans, of human with its own
reflections and questions that gives this existential drama. Like the
existential project just discussed, a confrontation takes plaee during
a span of time, it is a temporal phenomenon. However, no narrative
offered in response to a situation can give a closure of this sort,
because the telling has changed what was related as weil as
whoever told the tale. It is not the dilemma of Sartre's Roquentin,
to live or to tell, for no one is carried in a ·stream of time· beyond
a certain spot which he or she can now no longer recapture, but
rather we can't help but both live and tell inextricably in such a way
that each little detail of the world to which we are related has
become something other in the process and teils different tales to
each inquiry made by the protagonist becoming other to him or
herself. Camus, like the other thinkers we're discussing today
didn't see a way to transcend this inherence in the world and time
and remain a human being, who is of the rocks and shores and the
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events of history, so Sisyphus or the stranger or the doctor fighting
a plague can only fashion a story, an evolving meaning, an
interpretive act, and why Camus teils one who would wish to be a
philosopher to Wwrite in imagesWnot concepts.
Merleau-Ponty's reversibility is an accomplishment in the
course of time, in history of a sentient being, who gains its sense
of reality and identity from the indirect voices of perception. At any
particular instant in the relationship of the touching-touched hand,
one hand may indeed appear as an object, and one hand as the
subject. What can't happen is for this Cartesian clarity and
distinctness to withstand temporal becoming. Cartesian certainties
and dualities and the determinacy that ensues from them are
phenomena of the instant. Over the course of time, the fact that
one hand is touch, then the other, then at other moment more or
less ambiguously, become a history in which the boundaries in their
differing material relations have blurred, have crosshatched the
space in such a way that its sense is fluctuating, is comprised of
levels and vectors, of discontinuities and gaps, which nevertheless
form a thickness, a depth, in which things incompossible find a
tone, a chord, a rhythm, an overall sense of complex parts in
relation which signifies reversibility. At some moments of watching
Mt. St Victoire Cezanne feit in control, as if he were stealing its
secret, or imposing its order, at other times, he was helpless before
it, feeling his mind filled with stone or swayed by wind, burned out
by heat, and other moments were of differing modalities: in the life
of this perceiver or any perceiver of any dimension of the world,
there becomes within the passing of time that blurring of
boundaries, that uncertainty of who or what gave what to vision or
hearing or each sense and then one lives the reversibility with the
world. As Merleau-Ponty told us, before he himself had articulated
these insights, Wtime is the subject of perceptionWand there is no
inner man, since man is only in the world. In the world, there is no
return home, the tow hands are always uneasy in their relation; this
is not a happy philosophy of harmony, but rather a dynamically
tense one.
Now to see the charges made against Merleau-Ponty's
philosophy of art against this temporal background is to further
what Johnson claims. Nostalgia is a double attempt to torestall the
becoming of time. It seeks to relive emotionally, a time that was
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itself only a moment of process, as if it had been more perfect,
more of achunk of time and thus of idealized being, a solid core, a
particle without wavelike properties. It also emotionally seeks to
hide from the fact that this past is a constantly new past in the
present becoming of time and is always changing, never perfectly
recaptured in nostalgia. In this sense it seeks to flatten time, to
make it existentially a correlate of the traditional rationalist notion
of time as line of sequential moments which have occurred and are
to occur and to whose past moments we could naively return in
memory and try to retain. In some sense, most of Western art, like
most of Western culture has been nostalgic and far from Merleau-
Ponty hearkening back to this tradition, he seeks to break it open.
The depth that Johnson describes is not only the depth of different
themes that are incompossible but set into a whole that never forms
as a unified one but only a lived one in pereeptual, emotional,
intellectual, imaginative sense, but it is also an enjambment of
temporal dimensions. It is only through time that the
diseontinuities, the gaps, the juxtapositions come into one sense,
one that is fraught with interplays of forees, to use a Nietzschean
turn of phrase. Art has come more and more to reveal this proeess
of the eoming together through eneroaehment of the elear and
distinct, that of the opposed in sense, time and spaee, through the
process of being wrought, of being interpreted, that is not only the
artist's calling but that of all humans in intereourse with the world.
Merleau-Ponty, far from hearkening back to some more nostalgic
sense of the artist's calling has perhaps found a greater interlocutor
in today's postmodern artist.
I believe that Merleau-Ponty's foeus on sight in Eye snd
Mind and other writings on art has to do with the situation of art,
of Western culture, and of the perceptual style of our modern era.
Vision offers it5elf to Western eulture as that far-ranging ability to
dominate and order a landseape. As such, it has gained a
prominenee in a history of philosophy, science and ans, that seek
to eapture the world as spectacle and master it, and sees
understanding as some kind of possession by sight. If Merleau-
Ponty saw the task of the artist to set the spark of deflagration of
being, this fire-filled perception and expression is a destruction of
what is most static and self-contained, aloof from the pull of the
interehanging, temporally dynamic material world, a destruction of
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that idealization of experience, whether rendered figural or abstract
or photographie.
For Merleau-Ponty, meaning itself is not preexistent: it
emerges in the dialogue with the world, with others, with onese'f.
If seienee beeomes 50 self-eontained that it merely manipulates the
world, instead of eneountering it in perplexity and being transformed
by the dialogue, it loses it own sense. If art, loses this sense of
being foundationless in the beeoming of time, transforming its past
and that of the world it seeks to express, then it too loses it own
sense. Merleau-Ponty, like Susan Sontag, saw that photography
gave itself out to the publie as that meehanized non-human aeeess
to a statie reality, although what is most apparent is that this is its
partieular illusion, that aetually what is given most palpably by the
photo is the fact that the larger eontext in spaee, in eulture, in the
setting of the photographer, is cut out, is framed, is manipulated.
Sontag, in her book on photography, saw this double-edged sword
to the photo: taken as evidenee by the publie in newspapers, in
courts of law, as revealing Rthe facts, R the photo as proliferating
endlessly would eventually announce the opposite, that it is the
most manipulated art medium of all, and thus undermine the
equation of the idealized appearance of objectivity with the real.
The more reeent eomputere manipulated dimension of photography
and onter technieal breakthroughs only hastens and heightens this
process. Merleau-Ponty abhorred the use of photography or any
medium to disguise the inexorability of temporal becoming and the
inevitable indeterminaey it leaves us as it's gift, not it's curse. This
is not the happy piace of the soporific symbol of the nourishing
Mother. Neither is it the cruelty of terrifying totem of the ever
marching forward Father, laying down the law and the law of time
as endlessly dividing ourselves trom our past, trom ourselves.
Sometimes, it is hard to see these flowers are "wild," implosive and
explosive. Ves, it is pagan. For Merleau-Ponty one returns always
to that first moment, but not as origin, as nostalgia, but as ever
new, always transforming of itself and of all time, whieh means
devouring in flame, losing substance while gaining a flickering
illumination--an uneasy piace and time.
GLEN A. MAZZIS
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